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Abstract
This paper will examine the relationship between Scottish common-sense
philosophy and the formation of New Haven Theology. It will be illustrated
that Nathaniel William Taylor’s adaptations of orthodox Calvinism (particularly
the doctrines of election and predestination and total depravity) relied heavily
upon the principles of common-sense philosophy found in the work of Thomas
Reid. Furthermore, it will be argued that Taylor’s adaptation of Calvinism
was a necessary accommodation to the phenomenon of mass conversion and
evangelism during the Second Great Awakening.
Introduction
In antebellum America, the primacy of traditional Reformed (Calvinist)
theology, which for nearly 200 years had been the cornerstone of religious
life in the Protestant New World, was challenged by revivalism and
experiential piety, which called into question the hallmark Calvinist doctrines
of total depravity and election and predestination. Either Reformed theology
would need to reform yet again, and adapt to the contemporary religious
landscape, or it would run the risk of obsolescence in the face of the emerging
popularity of non-traditional forms of Protestant doctrine and experience.
New Haven theology, as epitomised by the work of Nathaniel William Taylor,
synthesised traditional orthodox Calvinism with the evangelistic concerns
surrounding the phenomenon of mass conversions during the time of the
Second Great Awakening, by appropriating a theological methodology which
relied heavily upon Scottish common-sense philosophy.1 Taylor’s innovative
approach to the doctrine of total depravity and rational approach to the
doctrine of election and predestination bore a strong resemblance to the
1 It should be noted that ‘common sense’ is not, as in the modern parlance, merely
the antithesis of folly. Rather, it is a philosophy which gives weight to the universal
availability and reliability of sense perception.
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philosophical work of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas
Reid. Both Reid and Taylor believed in the need for philosophy and theology
to be easily understood by the common person and to be grounded in
the legitimacy of personal experience. Furthermore, both Reid and Taylor
possessed a high view of anthropology, which manifested itself chiefly in
their position on the moral capacity of humankind.
Scotland’s philosophical trajectory
Glasgow and moral philosophy: Hutcheson, Smith, and Reid
In eighteenth century Glasgow, Hutcheson, Smith and Reid were the pre-
eminent figures in the University’s moral philosophy programme. Francis
Hutcheson2 was influenced by the moral philosophy of Shaftesberry,
and from his example developed a concept known as ‘moral sense’,
which placed the onus of moral construction upon the subject’s personal
feelings and dispositions towards actions. At the time he was judged an
Epicurean, whose approach to morality was understood as being overly
reliant upon emotion at the expense of reason or rationality. Furthermore,
his high view of anthropology as evidenced in his belief in human positive
moral agency, evoked censure of his work from the Glasgow Presbytery.3
According to the Presbytery, unregenerate human capacity for moral good
contradicted the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity. His opposition at the
time notwithstanding, Hutcheson’s theories were adopted in part by his
pupil Adam Smith,4 who was often a severe critic of his professor’s work.
Nonetheless, at least in one regard Smith followed in Hutcheson’s footsteps by
continuing to place the onus of moral construction upon the human subject –
although Smith’s moral philosophy was much more Stoic and rational in
its orientation than was the Epicurean and emotive ‘moral sense’ of his
predecessor. For Smith it was the human will (and not human emotions)
which became the centre of the moral universe. Accordingly, it was the
subject’s wilful conformity to social mores which made the subject a reliable
moral agent. As long as an individual willed to do that which would not
harm the other, that individual would be considered moral. Both Smith
and Hutcheson adhered to the metaphysical idealism of Hume, and as such
denied the subject’s direct access to the objective world. In such a philosophy,
the subject is placed precariously between two conflicting domains of reality.
Although the subject is understood to be able to correctly judge the good,
2 b. 1694, d. 1746, taught philosophy at Glasgow University from 1729.
3 Sydney Ahlstrom, ‘The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology’, Church History 24
(1955): 259.
4 b. 1723, d. 1790, professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University 1751–63.
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he or she has no reliable or direct access to the very world which was to be
judged. This tension was resolved in the common-sense philosophy5 of Reid,
which affirmed both the moral and the perceptual capacity of the subject.
Thomas Reid: common sense par excellence. Thomas Reid (1710–96)
is often considered to be the sine qua non of eighteenth-century Scottish
common-sense thought. Reid was a clergyman’s son from Aberdeenshire.
In his early career, he worked as a session clerk for the Kirk, and later was
accepted as Regent of Philosophy at King’s College, Aberdeen. In 1764,
Reid assumed Adam Smith’s chair as professor of Moral Philosophy at
Glasgow University. Reid represented the logical continuation of Glasgow’s
moral philosophy trajectory. Like his forebears, Reid held to a high view
of human moral capacity, and of the universal ability to choose that which
was morally responsible. But Reid’s chief departure from Hutcheson and
Smith centred on his personal disdain for the philosophy of David Hume.6
Hume’s metaphysical assertions, which denied the subject direct access to
the objective world, were understood by Reid to be complete and utter
lunacy. Reid’s common-sense approach to philosophy affirmed the reliability
of the senses and denounced idealism as a philosophy which promoted an
unnecessarily complex metaphysic. His opposition to Hume’s Treatise on Human
Nature is no more clearly stated than in Reid’s principal philosophical work,
the Inquiry into the HumanMind on the Principles of Common Sense. Through Inquiry, Reid
creates a forceful apologetic defending the reliability of subjective experience
in contradiction to Hume’s claims of radical scepticism. At the heart of this
debate on metaphysics, was the question of how relevant psychology was to
5 Although Reid’s common-sense philosophy was incredibly innovative; to say that
common-sense was first invented in Scotland or that before the eighteenth-century
Scottish Enlightenment no one had ever exhibited a penchant for common sense,
would ignore the principle common-sense texts of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, the
English revolutionary Richard Hooker, or even Jean-Jacques Rousseau whose Creed of
a Savoyard Priest lauds basic common-sense axioms. Additionally, outside of ‘Faculties
of Philosophy’, common-sense methodologies were exhibited by Francis Bacon and
Isaac Newton, whose dispositions towards and approaches to the sciences were the
quintessence of common sense. Ahlstrom, ‘The Scottish Philosophy and American
Theology’, 259.
6 It should be said that Reid’s philosophy, though reliant upon common-sense, and
seemingly antagonistic to Idealist philosophy, is not against reason. Reason, in Reid,
is based upon reality. ‘It is a common observation that it is unreasonable to require
demonstration for things which do not admit of it. It is no less unreasonable to require
reasoning of any kind for things which are known without reasoning, all reasoning
must be grounded upon truths which are known without reasoning.’ Thomas Reid,
‘Essays’ VII 3.3 in Sir William Hamilton, ed., The Works of Thomas Reid (Edinburgh:
Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863), 1:481–2.
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the creation of epistemology. Reid, unlike Hume, based his philosophy upon
the belief that objects and others were as they appeared to be.7 According to
Reid, perceptions revealed reliable information about objects and persons,
meaning that the underlying nature of the world was directly knowable by
the mind.8 Put succinctly, Reid’s common-sense philosophy held as its central
tenet the belief that human sensory capacity was reliable and profitable for
creating a map of the world, from which one could confidently navigate
through life. Reid believed that it was simply self-evident and ‘God-given’
that all people were created with, and readily exercised, the capacity to know
the world directly.9 The universal availability of reliable sensory perception
meant that it was not merely those who were trained in the art of reason
who could understand the world and execute proper moral choices.10 In
fact, the only caveat for this universal principle was the exclusion of lunatics
and philosophers; who in Reid’s witty repartee were both considered to be
capable of willingly doubting the existence of the world around them!11
Reid’s philosophy is based upon a series of principles, often referred to
as ‘first principles’ that are descriptive axioms upon which our experience
of the world is based. Though there are quite literally dozens of lists in his
work that numerate these principles, one of the more concise inventories
of common sense is found in the fifth book of his Essays. Twelve of these
principals are: (1) a belief in the existence of all things of which I am
conscious; (2) that my thoughts are my own; (3) that my memories are
7 This sentiment seems to reflect what I consider to be proto-phenomenological
philosophy which posits that objects are knowable in themselves by the human senses.
8 Reid commonly enjoyed using the foolishness of other philosophers as the object of
his own ridicule. For example, see ‘Essays’ II 8’.
9 According to Reid, reliable sensory knowledge of the world is given to humankind
by the ‘Supreme Being’. The capacity for this knowledge is given equally to all, from
‘the most ignorant to the most learned’. Reid, ‘Essays’ II 5 in Hamilton, ed., The Works
of Thomas Reid, 1:260.
10 ‘I believe no man of a sound mind ever doubted of the real existence of the operations
of mind, of which he is conscious. Nor is it to be doubted that, by the faculties which
God has given us, we can conceive things that are absent, as well as perceive those
that are within the reach of our sense; and that such conceptions may be more or less
distinct, and more or less lively and strong’. Reid, ‘Essays’ II 14 in Hamilton, ed., The
Works of Thomas Reid, 1:298.
11 In his third rule for perception, Reid asserts that it is not, ‘by a train of reasoning and
argumentation that we come to be convinced of the existence of what we perceive;
we ask no argument for the existence of the object, but we perceive it; perception
commands our belief upon its own authority, and disdains to rest its authority upon
any reasoning whatsoever.’ Reid, ‘Essays’ II 5 in Hamilton, ed., The Works of Thomas Reid,
1:259.
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reliable; (4) that my existence is self-constant; (5) that things really exist
which I perceive by my senses; (6) that I have ‘some degree’ of power over
my actions and the determination of my free will; (7) that my natural capacity
to distinguish truth from error is reliable; (8) that the other person has an
intelligent inner life; (9) that actions as well as words indicate thoughts in
the mind of myself and the other; (10) that testimony and personal opinion
are matters of regard; (11) that there are events which are self-evident; and
lastly (12) that nature will remain phenomenological self-referential: things
will be as they have been in similar situations.12 Reid, through enumerating
these principles, makes a case for the capacity of the common person to judge
their world, their life, and their history. The subject is no longer lost in a
Cartesian mist of self-doubt, and is able to emerge from the fog with dignity
and determinability. The priority which Reid places upon the individual is
also reflected in his theological work.
Excurses: Reid’s theological writings. In addition to teaching classes on
moral philosophy while at Glasgow, Reid also lectured on natural theology.
Despite the fact that Reid himself did not produce any sizeable works that
are considered purely theological, recent scholarship has created an edited
volume comprised of notes taken by students of Reid during his theological
lectures.13 This manuscript sheds valuable light upon Reid’s thinking on
theological matters, and although these lectures likely had nominal direct
bearing upon the theological landscape of antebellum America, they confirm
the legitimacy of much of the theological thought in the Protestant New
World; which as I will demonstrate below, was constructed in part from
Reidian principles.
For the sake of brevity, we will limit our investigation of Reid’s theology
to his position on total depravity. Reid departed from orthodox Calvinism’s
belief that the universal and total contamination of sin resulted in human
ineptitude for the good. In keeping with his high view of anthropology, in
his lectures On Natural Theology Reid clearly states that sin or the disposition to
sin, like so many other behaviours, is a learned rather than inherited trait.14
This implies that from birth, humans possess the capacity for positive moral
12 Reid, ‘Essays’ V 5–6 in Hamilton, ed., The Works of Thomas Reid, 1:442–51.
13 Elmer H. Duncan and William R. Eakin, eds., Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology
(1780) (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981).
14 ‘Men [sic] are led by natural instinct to imitate the actions of those around them. Now
this has an evident relation to society. . . even those affections which we call malevolent
show that we were intended for society as without it, we could have no occasion to
exercise them.’ Reid Lecture 18 in Duncan and Eakin, ed., On Natural Theology, 46.
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agency. Any failure in this capacity is not a predestined fact; it is simply a
result of poor socialisation.15 Quoting from Reid:
We can have no greater degree of testimony for the truth of anything
than the testimony of our senses and of these qualities which God has
given us; by these we discover that some propositions are true and
others false . . . now our judgment of right and wrong is as certain as
our judgment of true and false and to suppose that the Supreme Being to
have another standard of measuring them than we . . . is as absurd as to
say that he has a different conception of what is true and false . . .16
As we shall see below, this is precisely the sentiment towards sinfulness
adopted and developed by the New Haven Divines and Nathaniel William
Taylor in nineteenth-century antebellum America.
North American religious life
Calvinism
We now move our attention from the time, place, and work of Thomas
Reid, to the main theatre of our discussion: the Protestant New World of the
American Northeast. As with Reid in eighteenth-century Scotland, the early
religious climate of the fledgling American nation was principally Reformed
(Calvinist). Reformed theology relies heavily upon the writings of both John
Calvin and the Westminster Divines. Though it is far beyond the scope of this
essay to exhaustively consider the intricacies of Reformed theology, the brief
introduction to the doctrines of original sin/total depravity and election and
predestination provided below, will illuminate our subsequent discussion of
how changes to these doctrines occurred in the hands of the New Haven
Divines.
Original sin/total depravity. According to Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian
Religion, humankind suffers the consequence of sin because of Adam’s origi-
nal departure from the will of God. The fall of Adam, ‘effaced’ the
‘heavenly image in man’, and as a result, Adam, and ergo humankind, were
15 Obviously, this sentiment reeks of Enlightenment educational sensibilities, which
sought to provide proper culture and education to individuals, so as to create a stable
state. Yet, in Reid this disposition is used to supersede the traditional reformed view
of moral depravity. As we shall see below, this is precisely the direction which was
taken by Nathaniel William Taylor in regards to human sinfulness.
16 Reid Lecture 78 in Duncan and Eakin, eds., On Natural Theology, 97; Reid Lecture 84 in
Duncan and Eakin, eds., On Natural Theology, 99.
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punished by:
a withdrawal of the ornaments in which he had been arrayed . . . wisdom,
virtue, justice, truth, and holiness, and . . . in their place . . . blindness,
impotence, vanity, impurity, and unrighteousness, but he [Adam]
involved his posterity also, and plunged them in the same wretchedness.17
As a basis for his stance on original sin, Calvin reiterated Augustine’s position
on the same, by asserting that humankind is, ‘not corrupted by acquired
wickedness, but bring[s] an innate corruption from the very womb’.18
Because original sin is transmitted through heredity, all people (as ancestors
of Adam) are subsequently completely depraved: ‘All of us, therefore,
descending from an impure seed, come into the world tainted with the
contagion of sin. Nay, before we behold the light of the sun we are in God’s
sight defiled and polluted.’19
Election and predestination. The doctrine of election and predestination,
as a central tenet of Calvinism, is likely even more contentious and more
unsavory to its opponents than is Calvin’s doctrine of total depravity. Calvin
himself admits its complexities stating that: ‘To many this seems a perplexing
subject, because they deem it most incongruous that of the great body of
mankind some should be predestinated [sic] to salvation, and others to
destruction.’20
At the heart of the matter, the doctrine of election and predestination
implies that some of humankind have been selected by God for eternal
reward, whereas others have been predestined for eternal damnation. For
Calvin, this doctrine is a necessary means of maintaining or protecting the
absolute glory of God.21 In this system, God alone has the power to dispense
salvation, and no action of a single person could impede his or her divinely
predestined fate.22 In orthodox Calvinism it is God’s complete sovereignty
17 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, II.1.5.
18 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, II.1.5.
19 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, II.1.5.
20 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III.21.1.
21 ‘It is plain how greatly ignorance of this principle detracts from the glory of God, and
impairs true humility.’ Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III.21.1.
22 ‘All things always were, and ever continue, under his eye; that to his knowledge there
is no past or future, but all things are present, and indeed so present, that it is not
merely the idea of them that is before him, (as those objects are which we retain
in our memory,) but that he truly sees and contemplates them as actually under his
immediate inspection.’ Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III.21.1.5.
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and foreknowledge, and not his prescience, by which the elect are chosen.
Quoting again from Calvin, it is by ‘the eternal decree of God, by which he
determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every
man [sic]’, which implies that ‘all are not created on equal terms, but some
are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly,
as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he [sic]
has been predestinated to life or to death’.23
It becomes clear from the above, that Calvinism promotes an extremely
elevated view of God’s sovereignty (at times at the cost of his benevolence),
and an extremely low view of anthropology (at times at the cost of moral
agency). Even in this brief summary, one can see potential areas of conflict
between Calvinism and common-sense philosophy – particularly with regard
to moral capacity. Although in eighteenth-century Scotland this conflict
resulted in the official censure of the moral philosophy of Hutcheson;
in nineteenth-century America (in the hands of the New Haven Divines)
Scottish common-sense philosophy and its high anthropology were seen as
the saviours of what was considered to be the spirit of Calvinist Orthodoxy.
Scottish diaspora
Calvin’s theology played an enormous role in the development of North
American Protestant Christianity. Early American Protestants were directly
related to Calvinist Puritan sects in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
Britain. English puritans, who were theologically Reformed, escaped per-
secution in their home country by fleeing to Holland and then to the
New World in the seventeenth century. Later, a diaspora of Presbyterian
Scots flooded the Americas in the eighteenth century and beyond, bringing
with them not only their Reformed theological tradition, but also their
emerging philosophies. The Scottish-American diaspora contributed to the
already Reformed theological climate of the New World. Many historians
have commented on the undeniable influence of Scottish thought upon
the formation of the new American nation. The American Declaration of
Independence, the writings of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and the
American Constitution, reflect marked parallels with Scottish common-sense
philosophy.
In the world of politics, it would seem that Scottish common-sense
philosophy was employed by the fledgling nation to justify the war against
Britain and also as a means of outlining new principles of social order in
23 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, III.21.1.5.
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the absence of the crown.24 But from a theological perspective, the principal
use of Scottish common-sense philosophy was for restoring the place of
Christianity in absence of an established church. To this end, what made
Scottish philosophical thought so unique and so useful in the emerging
American religious situation, was its ability to facilitate religious thinking
apart from the Old World church, and the Old World philosophical systems.
On the one hand, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American theology
and philosophy represented a Christianised form of European Enlightenment
thinking, in which European ideals were adopted and integrated into
the American ethos. Yet, on the other hand, through their adaptation
by theologians, the Enlightenment ideals were so Christianised and so
‘Americanised’, that the American appropriation of the European Enlight-
enment became an entirely distinct phenomenon.25
In the theological world of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America,
it is likely that the first emissary of Scottish thought was the conservative
theologian John Witherspoon (1723–94), who left his native Scotland in
1768 to become the president of what was then called the College of
New Jersey in Princeton.26 Although early in his career as college president,
Witherspoon chose to favour the English philosophy of Berkeley and Locke,
over the common-sense philosophy of his fellow countryman Thomas Reid,
it quickly became clear to Witherspoon that in the American religious
situation (in which Deism, Unitarianism, and French Enlightenment
ideology were in ascendancy, whereas his own form of orthodox Calvinism
was in decline) the philosophical work of Thomas Reid was particularly well
suited to fortify the weakening bulwark of Calvinist orthodoxy against the
creeping tide of secularism which threatened the church.
Although Calvinism was challenged by Unitarianism and Deism, at the
heart of its decline was the fact that Calvinism seemed to function more
robustly as a state religion than it did as a non-enforced religious philosophy.
Without the pressures of a government to mandate a reformed theological
system, or an institutional church to mediate the means of grace to the
elect, Calvinism lost its appeal to the majority of Americans. Soon after
24 Mark A. Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), 233.
25 ‘The philosophical doubts of David Hume and the sneers at religion from French
savant Voltaire found little sympathy in the new nation. Yet important principles of the
enlightenment, as these had been refined by other Europeans of the eighteenth century,
came to exert near-universal domination in America.’ Noll, A History of Christianity in the
United States and Canada, 154.
26 Ahlstrom, ‘The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology’, 261.
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Witherspoon’s time, by the early nineteenth century, America was far more
secular a nation than it was a Christian, much less a Calvinist one.27
The closed sectarian policies of many of the early Protestant groups in
the New World during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant
that horizontal growth through proselytising seldom occurred (the Great
Awakening aside). When combined with a vertical or genetic decline in
the church’s demographic, caused by the strict pietistic lifestyles of many
of the reformed sects – which compelled younger generations to flee the
austere faith of their parents – it became clear that Reformed Christianity
was in need of some type of revolutionary change. It is most likely that
Witherspoon implemented Scottish common-sense philosophy because of
the emphasis it placed upon the individual’s capacity to know and judge
the truth. Whereas, in the Old World, Reformed confessions of faith were
encouraged through means of juridical legislation; in the New World and
in the absence of a state religion, it was the individual’s own sense which
needed to be compelled to faith through logically reasonable arguments.28
Following Witherspoon’s promotion of Reid’s writing, in a very short
time the message of Scottish philosophy was carried to ‘seminaries and
churches all over the country’,29 through the work of the great Princeton
divine Charles Hodge (1797–1878) and other Princeton academics, alumni,
and affiliates. Yet it wasn’t Hodge and the College of New Jersey which
made the most use of Scottish common-sense philosophy. Rather, it was
130 miles northeast of Princeton in New Haven, Connecticut – the seat of
Jonathon Edward’s theological legacy – that we find Scottish common-sense
philosophy’s most significant theological impact.
27 ‘If the colonial situation worked for the acceptance of revivalism, the situation under
religious freedom in the new nation [during the Antebellum period] tended to make
it imperative.’ It was noted by Professor Winfred Garrison that, ‘with 90% of the
population outside the churches, the task of organised religion could not be limited
to encouraging “Christian nurture”. . . in Christian families, or to ministering to old
members as they moved to new places farther west. It had to be directed toward that
90%. What they needed first was not nurture or edification, but radical conversion . . .
[and since they] followed no chiefs . . . they had to be brought in one by one.’
Winfred E. Garrison, ‘Characteristics of American Organised Religion’, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLVI (March 1948), 19, in Sidney E. Mead,
The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America (London: Harper & Row, 1976),
122.
28 Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada, 167.
29 Ahlstrom, ‘The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology’, 262.
68
Nathaniel William Taylor and Thomas Reid
The history of New Haven
In order to appreciate the gravity of the changes to Calvinism that were put
into effect by Nathaniel William Taylor, it will be necessary to attend to a brief
and illustrative survey of Taylor’s predecessors at Yale: Jonathon Edwards and
Timothy Dwight.
Jonathon Edwards. Jonathon Edwards (1703–58) is considered by some
to have been the greatest Calvinist theologian/philosopher in antebellum
America, and possibly the greatest in the history of America as a whole.
Edwards was born in 1703 and raised in North Hampton, Massachusetts.
He attended Yale College in 1716, graduated in 1720, and continued his
studies at the college until 1722. From early 1722 to 1723, Edwards served
as a minister of a Scottish Presbyterian church in New York, but he left this
position towards the middle of 1723, to continue his graduate studies at Yale
College. After completing his Master’s degree, he agreed to remain at Yale
for two years as a tutor in theology. He left his post in 1726 due to illness,
and later that year accepted a position as an assistant minister under his
grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, head minister of a Congregational Church
in Edwards’ hometown of Northampton. When Stoddard died, Edwards
took over his grandfather’s ministry, and led the church for many years.
Under Edwards’ care, the church experienced a tremendous revival from
1734 through 1739, which became known as the Great Awakening. He was
relieved of his charge in 1750 and died in 1758, mere months before he
was scheduled to assume a post as the new president of the College of New
Jersey in Princeton.
When one looks at Edward’s preaching, one does not readily equate it with
the stuff of modern day revivalism; it lacked much of the ‘razzamatazz’ that
contemporary revivalists are pejoratively known for. The meat of Edwards’
message is what came to be known as old-school Calvinism, and as such he
emphasised the universal and total depravity of humankind and the serious
nature of sin. It is clear in Edwards’ theology that his preaching would have
been aimed solely at the elect, and it is obvious in his message that his heart
was deeply concerned for their eventual conversion.
The theocentric emphasis of Calvinism found tremendous expression
through the writings and sermons of Edwards, who offered the best of his
skills to ensure that the importance of ‘God in everything’ was communicated
through his life and work. As a result, Edwards denied that humans would
have any ability to choose God simply out of a desire to escape the jaws
of hell, a topic which he is most famously known for in his sermon Sinners
in the Hands of an Angry God. According to Edwards (following Calvin), God
alone makes the decision of who is elect and who is not; assuming that
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one could thwart this divine plan would be complete hubris. Again, as in
Calvin, Edwards asserts that humankind is ultimately unable to choose God
or choose morality because of the totally corrupt state of the will.30 Edwards’
Freedom of the Will does offer limited freedom of choice to the individual (in
regards to conversion) but nothing of the sort that eventually develops in
the work Edwards’ grandson Timothy Dwight31 and in turn Dwight’s chief
pupil Nathaniel William Taylor.
Timothy Dwight. Timothy Dwight (1752–1817) as Jonathon Edward’s
grandson rightly saw himself as the inheritor of Edwardsian orthodoxy at
Yale Divinity School. He became the president of his Alma matter in 1795
and held this position until his death. While president of Yale, Dwight’s
revivalistic preaching affected at least one third of the university’s student
population, resulting in a very fervent religious environment at the school. He
was renowned for his vigorous defence of Calvinist orthodoxy against what
at the turn of the nineteenth century was considered to be the onslaught
of Unitarianism and Deist philosophy.32 Like so many apologists in his
day, as Dwight moved to defend Edwards and Calvin from these emerging
philosophies, he ultimately altered the very orthodoxy which he sought to
protect. In the case of Edwards’ theology, Dwight underplayed Edwards’
notion of divine responsibility for sin, and replaced it with his own belief
that the sinner was to blame for his or her own sinfulness; thus stressing the
sinner’s role in personal salvation and in the need for repentance.33 Towards
the end of Dwight’s tenure as president, the threat from Unitarianism and
Deism waned and a new challenge to Orthodoxy emerged in the form of
Methodist revivalism. The new challenge required a new Yale divine to rise
to the occasion.
The emergence of Methodism. Although at the time of Jonathan Edwards
the Protestant demographic in antebellum America was favourable to
Congregationalists and Presbyterians, as has been stated above by the mid-
nineteenth century the reformed groups were in decline. Towards the end of
Dwight’s tenure, Methodism was by far the most popular denomination,
30 Leo P. Hirrel, Children of Wrath: New School Calvinism and Antebellum Reform (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 14.
31 Dwight was not a substantial figure in the development of New Haven theology; he
was merely a transitional character. It has been noted though, that Dwight’s work
plainly reflected the ‘impact of wide reading in Scottish philosophers.’ Ahlstrom, ‘The
Scottish Philosophy and American Theology,’ 263.
32 Conrad Cherry. ‘Nature and the Republic: The New Haven theology’, The New England
Quarterly 51 (1978): 511.
33 Hirrel, Children of Wrath: New School Calvinism and Antebellum Reform, 27.
70
Nathaniel William Taylor and Thomas Reid
making up nearly 30 per cent of Protestant America.34 Although the
Reformed theology of New Haven and the Methodist theology of revivalism
differed significantly,35 we shall see that the reaction of the former to the
latter was more praxological than it was theological. New Haven theology
reinvented orthodox Calvinism in order to defend the practice of mass
evangelism and personal conversion – the very hallmarks of (Methodist)
experiential piety during the time of the Second Great Awakening.36 In this
setting it became clear to the Yale divines that the doctrines of election
and predestination and total depravity needed to adapt to the reality of
revival, and the new found popularity of experiential piety. Fortunately,
through Witherspoon’s introduction of the work of Thomas Reid into
theological world of the antebellum era, New Haven Divines had ready-at-
hand the philosophical tools they would need to justify and explain such
phenomena.
Nathaniel William Taylor
Dwight’s prized student, Nathaniel William Taylor, graduated from Yale
Divinity School in 1807. Shortly following graduation, Taylor went on
to tutor the Van Rensselaer family in Albany, but this sojourn into public
tutoring was short-lived, and he quickly returned to New Haven to resume
34 In 1776, Congregationalists made up 20 per cent of the Christian populations, with
Presbyterians trailing closely behind with 19 per cent. By the 1850s, this had changed
dramatically with Methodists holding 30 per cent, followed closely by Baptists at
20 per cent. Congregationalists and Presbyterians comprised only 15 per cent of the
population combined. Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada, 153.
35 Methodist revivalistic theology, compared to the orthodox Calvinism of Edwards and
Dwight, placed a strong emphasis upon human capacity to respond to divine grace.
Methodism had a high view of anthropology, resulting in a theology that affirmed
humanity’s ability to freely choose the moral or theological good. As mentioned above,
Edwards preached only to those who would respond to his message, as predetermined
by divine election. This is in contrast to the practices of Methodist revivalists such
as Francis Asbury who preached to all people, believing that anyone could respond
positively to God’s free offer of salvation. According to Methodist theology, God’s
desire that ‘none should perish’, overweighs the historical concept of election and
predestination.
36 It was the spirit of revivalism to require the communicant to make their conversion
decision at the moment of evangelistic proclamation. This quote from the nineteenth-
century revivalist Billy Sunday epitomises a revivalist’s belief that the individual was in
control of their eternal fate: ‘You are going to live forever in heaven, or you are going
to live forever in hell. There’s no other place – just the two. It is for you to decide. It’s
up to you and you must decide now.’ Billy Sunday in William G. McLoughlin, Jr, Billy
Sunday Was his Real Name (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 125 in Mead,
The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America, 196.
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his theological studies in the home of Timothy Dwight. After completing
his studies, Taylor accepted a position as minister of the First Congregational
Church of New Haven, where he served for nearly ten years. In 1822 he
returned to academic life, and took Dwight’s chair in Didactic Theology,
a position which he held until 1857 when ill health forced him to step
down.37
Taylor created an amalgam of Calvinism and common-sense, which
accounted for personal responsibility in the acceptance or rejection of
evangelistic proclamation and even natural revelation.38 As his primary tool
for adapting Reformed theology to the American situation, Taylor utilised his
exposure to Scottish common-sense philosophy.39 In keeping with common-
sense philosophy, Taylor had an optimistic view of human nature and a
high regard for anthropology.40 His affirmation of freedom was exceedingly
attractive to the society at large, which prized both political and social
freedoms.41 From a purely aesthetic perspective, in Taylor’s use of reason in
theology and in preaching, we see parallels with the tight logic and utilitarian
use of psychology so present in Thomas Reid’s own writing. However, like
Reid, central to Taylor’s work was the belief that philosophy and theology
were to be logical and commonly understood by all.
The theology of Taylor
We will examine below, the two main differences between Taylor and
orthodox Calvinism, and illustrate how these departures represent the way
in which Scottish common-sense philosophy was appropriated by Taylor to
accommodate revivalism during his time in the Second Great Awakening.
37 Bruce M. Stephens, ‘Nathaniel W. Taylor (1786–1858): On Speaking of the Trinity’,
Princeton Seminary Bulletin 66 (1973): 113–14.
38 This includes the human ability to observe and reason, which would ultimately enable
all humans to discover the same truths that theologians could discover in the Bible.
New Haven theologians asserted that all men and women could discover the existence
of God purely by reason. Hirrel, Children of Wrath: New School Calvinism and Antebellum Reform,
35.
39 ‘Nathaniel W. Taylor [was] the most original, powerful, and widely influential mind
which New England theology ever possessed. Dwight [Taylor’s mentor] had been
familiar with English and Scotch philosophy, and the great master Reid, and had
laid the foundation of the philosophy of common-sense, which Taylor adopted, and
which became the great offensive weapon of New England apology as well as its great
instrument of constructive reasoning.’ Frank Hugh Foster, A Genetic History of the New
England Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907), 246.
40 David F. Wells, Reformed Theology in America: A History of its Modern Development (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1985), 40.
41 Hirrell, Children of Wrath: New School Calvinism and Antebellum Reform, 39.
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Election and predestination. Taylor believed that scriptural doctrines could
not be ignored simply because they were difficult to understand; as is
certainly the case with the doctrine of election and predestination. He
believed that election, when understood properly, could be a doctrine which
would benefit both the converted and the non-converted.42 This is curious,
as traditional perspectives on election limit the scope of those benefiting
from the doctrine to the elect and the Divine; leaving those predestined for
damnation in the dark. In his lectures on Revealed Theology, Taylor offers three
examples of what he thinks election is not: (1) It is not a national election
of the people of Israel, or of any nation in particular; (2) it is not election to
salvation; and lastly (3) election as not based on a condition of repentance
(as is the case in the Armenian understanding of predestination on the basis
of divine foreknowledge of human choice).43 Taylor builds his doctrine of
election from three foundational principals: (1) Christ died for all people;
(2) all will be saved if they repent and believe the gospel; and lastly (3) it is
the will of God for all people to repent and believe, so that they may, ‘comply
with the terms of life rather than continue in sin’.44 Taylor is clear that it is
God’s unconditional will for the whole of humankind to receive the benefits
of salvation.45
Obviously Taylor’s notion of election is markedly different than his
predecessors, who would argue that God’s offer of salvation through the
propitiation of sin is limited in its availability to only the elect.46 In Taylor’s
thought, election and predestination is general and universal, and intimately
connected with universal moral agency, which we shall see below becomes
itself the vehicle of election.
42 According to Taylor, election is ‘a doctrine of most salutary practical tendency; directly
fitted to augment the power of other truths; adapted to sanctify, to strengthen, to
comfort and perfect the saints and to rouse the sinner to instant, direct, and decisive
effort in the work of his salvation’. Nathaniel William Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon
Select Topics in Revealed Theology, ed. Bruce Kuklick (New York: Garland, 1987), 373.
43 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 374.
44 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 375–6.
45 ‘God would that all men [sic], elect or non-elect, should turn and live, rather than sin
and die.’ Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 377.
46 Regarding the atonement, Taylor posits: ‘God . . . has made abundant provision for the
salvation of every human being; that all will be saved if they comply with the terms
of salvation . . . as free moral agents [all] can comply with these terms . . .’ This view
of a general atonement is so contrary to orthodox Calvinism, it is hard to see any
semblance of Edwardsian influence at all! Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in
Revealed Theology, 389.
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Total depravity. Even though God may desire47 to save all (both elect
and non-elect) there is still the nagging issue of the existence of sin and
the problem of human wickedness. Indeed, theodicy is not simply pushed
aside because of Taylor’s innovative approach to election and predestination.
Contrary to Calvinist orthodoxy,48 which understood ‘sin [as] the necessary
means of the greatest Good’49 (thus making the damnation of the non-elect
an offering to the Glory of God), Taylor posited the following:
What kind of mercy . . . produces evil merely for the sake of putting an
end to it . . . does a benevolent God design and so order his providence
that our whole race shall fall into the gulf of sin and ruin for the sake
of showing his mercy in their rescue; and this when he could as well
have preserved them and all other beings in the purity and joys of perfect
holiness for ever . . . call this mercy, if you will, but oh, ascribe not such
mercy to our God!50
Furthermore, in his famous sermon Concio ad Clerum,51 Taylor asserts that
human depravity ‘does not consist in any essential attribute or property
of . . . any thing created in man by his Maker’. To enforce this point, he asks
the rhetorical question, ‘Does God create in men [sic] a sinful nature and
damn them for the very nature he creates? Believe this who can’.52 For Taylor,
moral depravity is not: (1) a propensity to sin in humankind’s constitution;
(2) an excitement or desire to sin; or (3) a disposition to sin which is caused
by a first sin.53 Indeed, the thought that sinfulness is an inherited trait, is
utterly reprehensible to Taylor.
47 Although Taylor is clearly a part of the rational theological tradition, and in direct line
with the Scottish common-sense tradition, he does have certain romantic tendencies.
For example, he emphasises the desire of God to save all, by illustrating the passion of
God for the lost: ‘yea with the compassion of a God; he desires, he longs that under
the influence he uses, every sinner should repent and live, rather than sin another
movement’. Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 378.
48 Taylor’s position on the foolishness of moral depravity being the fault of the divine
creation echoes the same sentiment in Reid, who agrees with Taylor that humankind
is divinely given a moral sense that is the same as its maker. C. F. Reid, Lecture 78 in
Duncan and Eakin, eds., On Natural Theology, 97.
49 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 381.
50 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 381.
51 Literally, ‘Preaching to the Converted’
52 Nathaniel William Taylor, Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature and Freedom [on-line];
available from http://www.moody.edu/undergraduate/bibletheo/theo/Quiggle/
ge420/taylor.htm; accessed 28 February 2003.
53 Taylor, Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature and Freedom, Section 1.
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And what sort of philosophy, reason or common sense is this – a sin before
the first sin – sin before all sin? Do you say there must be difficulties in
theology? I ask must there be nonsense in theology?’54
Moral agency and election. Sinfulness is not created by God in humanity
nor is it inherited in humanity through the concept of original sin. For
Taylor, sin is the responsibility of the sinner, and it is God’s purpose ‘to
secure the holiness of as many of his moral creatures as it is possible’. But
according to Taylor, God does so not through election of the individual, but
through the establishment of a moral system and personal moral capacity.
Herein lies the essential theme in New Haven theology: moral agency and
moral government are a means of creating an environment that is conducive
to the divine act of election; because positive moral agency is the means of
election, all humanity (converted and non-converted) benefit from election.
In contrast to his predecessor, Jonathon Edwards, Taylor does not believe
that moral agency is a compromise between God’s omnipotence and human
freedom, rather according to Taylor:
Every subject of such a kingdom must be a free agent; i.e. he must possess
the power to sin, and to continue to sin, in defiance of all that God can do
to prevent him. If God destroys this power, he destroys his moral agency,
and then even God cannot make him holy.55
God functions benevolently by electing moral agency as a system that allows
all creatures to choose God or wickedness. God’s benevolence is not found
in the elimination of sin, but in the creation of a just system which allows
for morally culpable beings to choose for, or against, God and the good.
According to Taylor, it is the only and best means of accomplishing infinite
goodness. He argues that if this system fails to bring the individual to
salvation, the fault is not in the system but the individual.56
Taylor maintains that sinfulness is purely the result of humankind’s own
actions, which consist of a free choice of some other object than God or
the good. Depravity for Taylor is the propensity to sin when the occasion
arises.57 His belief that the individual can act contrary to the will of God
54 Taylor, Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature and Freedom, Section 1.
55 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 382.
56 ‘It is no impeachment of a father’s kindness that its results are impaired or prevented
by the child’s perverseness.’ Rather, it is the human will which thwarts the divine
plane. Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 385.
57 Taylor, Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature and Freedom, Section 2.
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in regards to personal salvation is perhaps Taylor’s greatest departure from
orthodox Calvinism. In his words, it is ‘the sinfulness of the sinner [that]
limits God’s ability to bring him [sic] to repentance’.58 Incidentally, because
for Taylor sinning is in the acting, unlike Calvin he asserts that newborns are
free from the contamination of sin:
If then you ask, what becomes of an infant if he dies, while yet an infant? I
answer, he may be saved; in my belief he is saved, through the redemption
that is in Christ Jesus. If you ask, how can this be? I reply he belongs to
a race who by nature, in all the circumstances of their immortal being
without the grace of this redemption, will sin.59
A common-sense approach to Revivalism
Because humans have the power to choose sin they also have the power
to choose God (in the context of the preaching of the Christian Gospel).
This means that preaching and evangelism become highly effective means of
offering salvation. Taylor writes:
To what purpose do we preach the gospel to men, if we cannot reach the
conscience with its charge of guilt and obligations to duty? And how I
ask can this be done, unless sin and duty be shown to consist simply and
wholly in acts and doings which are their own?60
Taylor argues that Christian proclamation (such as Edwards’) which relied
upon a presupposition of the election and predestination of individual hearers
(in order for the message to be effectual), did not effectively communicate
the gravity of human guilt for sin:
Will the charge of such sin on man, touch the secret place of tears? . . . If so,
preach it out – preach it consistently – preach nothing to contradict it –
dwell on your message, that God creates men sinners and damns them
for being so . . . but such is not the message of wrath and of mercy, by
which a revolted world is to be awed and allured back to its maker. The message
we are to deliver to men [sic] is a message of wrath, because they are the
perpetrators of the deed that deserves wrath. (emphasis mine)61
58 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 387.
59 Taylor, Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature and Freedom, Remarks 1.
60 Taylor, Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature and Freedom, Remarks 5.
61 Taylor, Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature and Freedom, Remarks 5.
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Taylor’s theology enabled one to preach the Gospel with the expectation
that all who came forward could potentially benefit from the offer of divine
grace. His view not only takes into account the practice of mass evangelistic
preaching, but also engages the substantial response to such preaching by
those claiming to have experienced some sort of conversion. I would argue
that Taylor’s adaptation of the doctrine election and predestination tacitly
reflects a common-sense analysis of evangelism. In this respect, Taylor appears
to be relying on two principles of common sense: (1) that history will remain
constant and (2) that personal testimony is reliable.62 Taylor appears to make
a theological accommodation to testimonies of conversion which would
otherwise be considered suspect in light of strict Calvinist orthodoxy. The
massive response to evangelism during Taylor’s time could be understood in
one of three ways:
1. that, in his time, evangelism was particularly fruitful because there existed
a higher density of the elect among the general population than would
normally have been the case;
2. that conversion experiences were indeed shared by both elect and non-
elect, but that genuine conversions were only effectual for those who
were among the elect, leaving the professing non-elect to their eternal
damnation;
3. that there was a genuine conversion of all who responded to the
evangelistic message, because all people are elect, and are free to respond
to the message of salvation.
The first option, though possible, does not seem plausible in light of the
common-sense principle that history will continue to function consistently.
It begs the question, ‘Why would God have a higher density of elect souls in
nineteenth century antebellum America than were present at other periods
of history?’ The second option is completely untenable, in as much as it
denies the common-sense principle which lauds the reliability of personal
testimony. Besides, the very thought that one could profess to conversion,
but have this confession be ineffectual because of their status as a non-
elect person, is distasteful at best. Unlike the other two options, the third
choice passes unscathed the critique of common-sense philosophy. It seems
62 In Reid’s time, his use of the concept of ‘testimony’ was purely juridical, the underlying
concept which depends upon the others truthful expression of personal experience,
holds true as the shared dimension of the principle. Reid, ‘Essays’ VII 3.3 in Hamilton,
ed., The Works of Thomas Reid, 1:482.
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most logical that those responding to the Christian message are doing so
genuinely, and that their testimony to the fact reveals the underlying salvific
work of Grace, apart from individual election. Therefore, if mass conversions
were indeed efficacious apart from individual election, Calvinist orthodoxy
would need to adhere to a more universal conception of election and
predestination.
Taylor’s concerns with Revivalism bled through into his portrayal of the
Doctrine of God. For Taylor, God was constantly and passionately in pursuit
of the lost by way of moral agency and natural revelation. Taylor described
God as crying out from heaven, ‘Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ . . . my son,
give me thine heart.’ Through moral agency, the inner voice of humanity
expresses to itself, ‘every denunciation of wrath, heaven, earth, judgment,
hell [calling the will to] Do it! Do it!’ – in regards to accepting the divine offer
of salvation.63 Taylor firmly believed that God gave humankind the capacity
to completely turn away from sin, and turn to God – humanity are told to do
so through the admonition of the will and the whole of the ordered world.64
In the spirit of revivalism Taylor urged his audience to, ‘remember that if
you do not begin, God will never convert you and if you delay little longer,
there is a fearful probability that God will give you up to determined sin and
final ruin’.65
For Taylor, because of the power of human choice, God was not responsible
for the eschatological fate of individuals. Taylor states that ‘in hell I am ruined,
self ruined . . .’;66 no one is responsible for an individual’s rejection of the
divine gift except for that individual. Taylor was resigned to the fact that
some would unfortunately turn away from the divine gift, and face ruin and
eternal separation from God. He recognised that this was the horrible curse
that came in tandem with the incredible gift of human freedom. According
to Taylor, ‘the doctrine of election, of man’s free agency, of God’s sincerity
and the necessity of action on the part of sinners are true, and consistent
truths. They are solemn and awful truths, too.’67 For Taylor, it would be
humankind’s power to ‘choose the contrary’ with regards to God’s gracious
offer of salvation, which would constitute the end product of the divinely
executed system of moral agency.
63 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 398.
64 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 400.
65 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 406.
66 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 388.
67 Taylor, Essays, Lectures Etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, 424–5.
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Early objections to Taylor
As is often the case with innovations in theology, objections abounded68
(and abound) to Taylor and New Haven theology.69 Many likened New
Haven theology to Pelagianism in the early church. Taylor’s chief opponent,
Charles Hodge, was a keen defender of Old School Calvinism and 70 feared
that Taylor’s system would empty the significance of the work of Christ on
the cross, leading to theological universalism.71 Furthermore, Hodge was
particularly concerned about Taylor’s understanding of humankind’s ability
to be indifferent to divine grace. In his Systematic Theology, Hodge condemns
New Haven theology as being a
doctrine of contingency, which has been held under different names and
variously modified. Sometimes it is called the liberty of indifferences, by
which is meant, that the will at the moment of decision is self-posed to,
among conflicting motives to decide one way or the other, not because of
the greater influence of one motive over others, but because it is indifferent
or undetermined, able to act in accordance with the weaker against the
stronger motive or even without any motive at all . . . The advocates of
this theory of liberty, therefore, maintain, that the will is independent
of reason, of feeling, and of God. This is no middle ground, they say,
between uncertainty and fatalism, between the independence of the will
and the agent and the denial of all free agency.72
68 Other extant scholars besides Hodge criticised Taylor’s theology. Ebenezer Porter from
Andover Seminary accused Taylor of questioning the ‘old paths’ and shedding darkness
on the world. He also said that New Haven theology was essentially ‘a channel
of communication between Calvinism and Pelagianism.’ Ebenezer Porter in Joseph
Harvey, Letters on the Present State and Probable Results of Theological Speculations in Connecticut (no
publication information), 27–28 in Wells, Reformed Theology in America: A History of its
Modern Development, 40.
69 This conflict also manifested itself in a feud between Princeton and Yale, which in
addition to being a theological and philosophical conflict, was also a political one
which revolved around the question of who was to be considered the legitimate heir
to the Jonathon Edwards’ theological legacy. Yale, as the traditional home of Edwards,
was threatened by Princeton whose divines considered themselves to be the rightful
intellectual descendents of Edwards’ orthodoxy.
70 Oddly, Hodge, this chief polemicist against Taylor and New Haven theology, was
himself steeped in the same common-sense philosophy as Taylor, but implemented
this philosophy in an utterly different way. Cf. Ahlstrom, ‘The Scottish Philosophy and
American Theology’, 266.
71 Wells, Reformed Theology in America: A History of its Modern Development, 46.
72 Hodge’s view betrays his pessimistic understanding of moral agency, and describes
a God who is unwilling to allow his creation to have any freedom. Charles Hodge,
Systematic Theology (London: James Clarke, 1960), 2:282–4.
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Further objection to New Haven theology came in 1853 when James Wood
(an Old School Presbyterian) addressed the ‘settlements’ of New Haven
theology, with regards to the ‘theories of the mind, of free agency, and
of moral government . . . introduced by the new philosophy’. Like Hodge,
Wood expressed concern over Taylor’s belief in humankind’s ability to
choose sinfulness or grace, and to the ‘settlements’ (accommodations) that
this theology made to experiential piety. His conclusion was that these
‘philosophies’ were not new, but originated ‘long ago as in the time of
Pelagius and they have sprung up and flourished for a while at different
periods since’.73 The philosophy which Wood refers to is undoubtedly the
Scottish common-sense philosophy, which like the theology of New Haven,
and the theology of Pelagius in the fourth and fifth centuries, offered an
elevated role of human capacity to choose the good.
Even in the present day, orthodox Calvinists continue to debate about
New Haven theology. The American Presbyterian Church sees ‘Taylorism’ as
a ‘third step’ from orthodoxy, which will ultimately lead to Unitarianism.
They understand Taylor’s ‘New Divinity’ as a corruption of orthodoxy and
an attempt at usurping ‘the orthodox Calvinistic theology of the New
England puritans’ which they believe may eventually result in ‘full blown
Pelagianism’.74 The Old School/New School Calvinist debate is also a feature
in contemporary contention between American Congregationalists and the
Presbyterian Church (USA).
Taylor’s legacy in Revivalism. Slander and dissent aside, Taylor’s adaptation
of Calvinist Orthodoxy did find a surprising extant proponent in
the nineteenth century. Charles Finney (1792–1875), the so called
father of modern-day Revivalism, appropriated Taylor’s belief in personal
conversion into his own theological cache. Before Finney had moved from
Presbyterianism to Methodism, he read and admired the work of Taylor and
the New Haven divines, asserting that ‘Taylor was correct: humans do have
within themselves the power for choosing Christ and living holy lives.’75
Finney’s ‘New Measures’ adopted New Haven theology, and represented a
shift in evangelistic practices which emphasised the role of human choice
73 James Woods, The Doctrinal Differences which have Agitated and Divided the Presbyterian Church: or
Old and New Theology (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1853), 20.
74 American Presbyterian Church, ‘The New Divinity’, Presbyterian History [on-line];
available from http://www.americanpresbyterianchurch.org/the new divinity.htm;
accessed 28 February 2003.
75 Charles Finney in Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada, 235.
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in the process of salvation. Finney’s belief in the ‘free enterprise of religion’
seems to have borrowed from Taylor’s universal ‘moral agents’.76
Conclusion
Taylor and his Yale cohorts established a theological system that provided a
sensible interpretation of orthodox Calvinism in the face of the experience
of revivalism in his day. New Haven theology adapted to trends in religious
and pietistic life, as well as the assault upon orthodoxy by Unitarians and
Deists, by employing the common-sense philosophy of the Old World, to
the distinctly New World religious landscape. In so doing, Taylor echoed
Reid’s positive optimism regarding the human condition and human moral
capacity, while still retaining a sense of humankind’s ultimate dependence on
God’s grace for the capacity to choose Christ. Furthermore, Taylor’s defence
of the efficacy of individual conversions during mass evangelism, revealed an
underlying foundation in Scottish common-sense principals, which lauded
the human capacity to know and judge the world through the senses. Taylor’s
theology, though significantly different from Calvin or even Edwards, made
a form of Calvinism applicable to the religious landscape of antebellum
America.77
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